The Sino-Russian strategic partnership
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The demise of the Soviet Union some thirteen years ago
left the United States in an unprecedented position of global supremacy,
unrivaled by any other single state in terms of military or economic power.
This created what many refer to as a unipolar international order, a rare and
ephemeral phenomenon in the modern era of the nation-state. The calculus of
international politics dictates that weaker states, acting in their own
self-interest, align to check the influence of the preeminent power,
in this case the United States.
Such an alignment has in fact developed over the past
decade. Communist China, a rising power with an ambitious strategic vision that
is largely inimical to American interests, has forged a partnership with
Russia, which has its own strategic objectives, to counteract what both nations
perceive as a dangerous preponderance of American power. This confluence of
interests has resulted in the development of political, military and economic
cooperation between the two nations that has greatly enhanced China’s ability
to realize its strategic goals in East Asia ― and beyond.
It
is a development that may have serious, perhaps profound, strategic
implications for the United States. The American Defense Council believes that
the United States ignores this growing challenge at its own peril, even as it
conducts a worldwide campaign against the forces of terror, for China
represents a formidable challenge to American interests in Asia that will most
likely grow in years to come. The Council regards Russia as the junior partner
in this relationship, with an ascendant and increasingly assertive China being
the principle beneficiary. Interestingly, China also regards its relationship with
Russia, which it views as a declining power, in a similar vein.
This
report is an attempt to detail the political, military and economic
developments that have shaped the Sino-Russian relationship over the past
decade. Special emphasis will be placed on Russian arms transfers to China, as
these have substantially enhanced China’s ability to project power beyond its
shores and threaten the peace of the strategically vital East Asian region. It
is these capabilities, combined with a bold strategic vision, that potentially
represent a signal threat to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific.
POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS
One
of the more noteworthy diplomatic developments in the past decade is the
burgeoning of Sino-Russian strategic ties. Nations don’t have friends – only
interests. The Sino-Russian rapprochement, or something resembling one, seemed
an almost inevitable outgrowth of post-Cold War geopolitical realignments, with
the United States standing bestride the world like a Colossus, without a
competing center of influence. By improving relations with each other, Russia
and China could then counter what they perceived as the malign influence of the
United States, which they believed was acting to restrict both countries’
pursuit of national interests.
A
1993 article in Asian Survey went so far as to suggest that the
post-Cold War Sino-Russian relationship was no less than a “modern, Eastern
version of Rapallo,” the 1922 treaty between Weimar Germany and the Soviet
Union representing a pact between two continental powers “united by their real
or imagined grievances against the West.”
Although the historical analogy fails in important respects, it does contain a
core element of truth. The Sino-Russian strategic relationship is certainly
animated by a deep concern about American power, at the very least.
The
modern phase of Sino-Russian relations that characterized the post-Cold War
era, marked by improved relations, began in 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev
visited Beijing. This visit helped put a formal end to the period of tension
that had characterized Sino-Soviet relations since the 1960s, which featured
numerous border skirmishes along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers that at times
threatened to escalate to general conflict. Gorbachev’s desire to improve
Sino-Soviet relations stemmed largely from the Soviet need for massive economic
reforms, in which China could play a large part.
A
weakened Moscow was now largely willing to satisfy the conditions that China
had demanded before relations could be normalized. China had insisted upon the
removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the elimination of Soviet support
for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the reduction of troops along the
Chinese border. With the
Soviet Union willing to meet these demands, key stumbling blocks were removed
and a new era in Sino-Soviet relations was possible.
Sino-Russian
ties grew increasingly strong during the 1990s as ideological differences faded
into memory and the vagaries of international politics conspired to bring the
two countries closer together. Quite simply, the prospects of tangible gains
resulting from cooperation, primarily in the military and economic spheres,
largely outweighed the mutual distrust that so marked Sino-Soviet relations.
China
saw in Russia a veritable treasure trove of military equipment and technology
that the West had denied China following Tiananmen. It also had a rapidly
growing economy and saw in Russia vast reserves of energy that could help China
meet its mounting demands. Russia found in China an eager customer for its
military wares and raw materials, the revenues from which Moscow desperately
needed. They saw in each other a partner to counter what they both perceived as
an arrogant, overly assertive United States that was encroaching on both of their
national interests.
Resting
on mutual perceptions of rational self-interest, Russia and China felt
threatened by the expansion of U.S.-led security alliances left over from the
Cold War. Russia felt marginalized by NATO’s assertiveness in the Balkans and
feared the prospect of its eastward expansion, as Moscow’s relatively
short-lived infatuation with “Atlanticism” failed to meet expectations.
Developing closer ties with another great power that also shrank from the
prospects of a U.S.-led international order would enhance Moscow’s ability to
influence U.S. policy and restrain the American ability to encroach upon
perceived Russian interests. Certainly, it would provide Russia with more
strategic latitude than Washington, or Brussels for that matter, would provide.
China
also found opportunities in closer ties with Russia that it could not otherwise
obtain. Beijing felt that the United States was pursuing a policy of
containment designed to effectively limit Chinese power in East Asia. It felt
hamstrung by American power, which stood in the way of its reunification with
Taiwan and its ability to assert its influence in the region. By strengthening
ties with Russia, China sought to expand its political and strategic leverage
over the United States, which would place limits on America’s ability to meddle
in what Beijing perceives as its natural spheres of influence.
Both
Russian and China opposed U.S.-led interventions in the name of human rights
that violated traditional notions of national sovereignty and placed an
excessive emphasis on human rights. China was concerned about this dimension of
U.S. foreign policy, given its brutal occupation of Tibet, and Russia was
concerned because of its abuses in Chechnya.
Both
Russia and China also feared Islamic terrorism and separatist movements
emanating from the vast unstable post-Soviet spaces of Central Asia that
threatened to rend their national unity. They realized that joining forces
would allow them to meet these threats more successfully and create stability
along their common border, which neither country could effectively do alone.
Russian and Chinese desires to promote peace and stability on their borders
strengthened their commitment to resolving long-standing disputes, which had
been ansore during the Soviet era.
Throughout
the 1990s, China and Russia resolved most of the disputes along 4,300-kilometer
border, which had played such an integral part in the Sino-Soviet rift during
much of the Cold War. Both sides further agreed that remaining disputes would
be settled peacefully and fairly. The resolution of border disputes fostered
stability along shared borders and promoted mutual trust, which was critical in
building the necessary foundation upon which a “strategic partnership” could be
built. By ensuring stability along their borders, both countries could free up
resources and political capital that could be applied elsewhere.
Russian
sources estimate that Moscow spent $100 billion over a twenty-year period to
meet the “China threat” along the border areas.
Beijing also devoted significant resources to meet the Soviet challenge.
Solving their border disputes and creating stability in Central Asia allowed
Russia and China to shift their attention away from what had been a source of
considerable tension since the 1960s, towards other strategic areas of concern
for both countries. Stability on the Chinese border allowed Russia to withdraw
its forces and concentrate on reasserting its influence in the Caspian Sea
region, for example, with its vast energy reserves.
This
withdrawal of Russian troops from the border areas also offered Beijing a much
greater degree of strategic flexibility. Russian troops on its borders were an
irritant that tied China down to a certain extent, which practically speaking,
constrained its military and political influence in other critical areas.
Stability on its inland borders allowed China to shift towards a more
aggressive eastward-looking maritime strategy and to concentrate its military
forces in the eastern, more strategically significant areas. This was evident
following the 1992 Russian withdrawal from Mongolia, which, not coincidentally,
led to Chinese declarations of extensive territorial claims in the East and
South China Seas.
By
creating stability along their border, Russia and China came to view the other
as its “strategic rear” as the 1990s progressed. China, in fact, was more than
willing to let Russia assume the role of regional gendarme, since it at once
offered Beijing the flexibility to direct its energies elsewhere while serving
to defend its interests along its borders.
Russia
and China also collaborated to fill the power vacuum created by the Soviet
collapse by establishing a regional security organization, known as the
“Shanghai Five.” This organization consisted of Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan. In 2001, with the addition of Uzbekistan, the group
became the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”
This further promoted border stability, force reduction and confidence building
along the 7,000-kilometer border between China and the post-Soviet states. With
the resolution of border disputes well underway, Russia and China were steadily
consolidating their relationship, which was made evident by the summit
diplomacy the two countries embarked upon throughout the 1990s.
The
1990s witnessed a series of summits between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin -
seven summits were held between 1992 and 1999, over the course of which both
countries increasingly solidified their relationship. A “strategic partnership”
had been evolving since the early 1990s, when the countries’ leadership began
using the term “constructive partnership” to describe their relationship. In
1994, Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev proposed to raise their bilateral
cooperation from a constructive partnership to the level of “strategic
partnership.”
China
and Russia first announced their plans for the development of a “strategic
partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the
twenty-first century”
at a 1996 summit in Shanghai between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin. By raising
Sino-Russian relations to another level, the 1996 summit marked a new phase in
the two countries’ relations. Several documents were signed by both leaders to
advance bilateral cooperation in the political, military and economic spheres.
Their
joint statement reaffirmed that the two countries would work together in the
resolution of border disputes, in addition to fostering economic development
and Asian-Pacific security. Most importantly, they reached agreement on a
number of foreign policy objectives, whereby Russia and China mutually
supported each other’s principle geopolitical claims. Russia agreed that Taiwan
and Tibet were inseparable parts of China, while China agreed that Chechnya was
an integral part of Russia.
China also supported Russia’s opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion.
This
was a safe and carefully calibrated political gesture that represented a stable
base upon which to build future relations. China looks eastward to East Asia as
its primary strategic focus, while Russia focuses primarily westward, towards
Europe. Russia had no particular stake in the Taiwan dispute or the status of
Tibet, and China was only obliquely concerned about the Chechnyan conflict,
much less NATO expansion. Both countries could therefore support each other’s
principle claims without encroaching upon the other’s interests. This was, and
is, a very important factor shaping the Sino-Russian partnership.
The
1996 joint statement condemns the existence of “hegemonism,” a heavily
freighted term both countries use in thinly veiled reference to the United
States. While claiming that their partnership is not directed against any third
country, Russia and China are clearly in league to check U.S. power worldwide.
Warnings of “hegemonism” and “unipolarity,” are almost universally cited in
joint texts to underscore their commitment to creating a “multipolar” world –
one with alternate centers of influence to counter the perceived U.S. dominance.
Paranoia about U.S. power, especially on the part of the Chinese, runs deep. As
one observer at the Chinese Foreign Ministry opines, “The U.S. strategic aim is
to seek hegemony in the whole world,” and it will not tolerate the rise of any
power that will “constitute a threat to its leading position.”
At
a 1997 summit, the two countries furthered their commitment to promote a new
international order based on “multipolarity.” In another joint statement,
Russia and China pledged to work in concert to promote the “multipolarization
of the world and the establishment of a new international order,” while
opposing any nation that seeks “hegemony, practices power politics, or
monopolizes international affairs.”
Both countries also declared further NATO expansion “impermissible.” A 1998
joint statement, “Sino-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century,” also
repeated the predictable calls for multipolarization and the end of American
domination.
While
declaring once again at the 1997 summit that Chinese-Russian relations,
including cooperation in the field of military technology “are in no way
targeted against any third country,”
these statements rang particularly hollow. In addition, both countries
supported the lifting of sanctions against Iraq launched broadsides against a
potential U.S.-led East Asian theater missile defense system, as well as an
American national missile defense.
Russia
and China were driven further together in 1999 by the American-led intervention
in Kosovo and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which Beijing
considered a deliberate attack. Prior to the intervention, Russia had been
eager to strengthen ties with China to offset the proposed NATO expansion, to
which China was more or less indifferent, despite its professed support of
Moscow’s position on the matter that found expression in joint statements.
Beijing’s principle concern was maintaining a peaceful and stable border with
Russia. Practically speaking, NATO was Russia’s concern.
However,
the use of force in Kosovo and the bombing of the Chinese embassy, in
particular, reinforced Beijing’s fears about American hegemonic ambitions,
driving China further into Moscow’s outstretched arms. To Beijing, this was
proof of American treachery and ample evidence that the U.S. regarded China as
an enemy. Following the embassy bombing, a Moscow-Beijing hotline was
immediately established.
New
leadership in both countries did not stray from the path that their
predecessors laid down during the 1990s. Vladimir Putin advanced Sino-Russian
relations following Yeltsin’s departure. Shortly after assuming power, Vladimir
Putin held a summit with his Chinese counterpart, where both leaders accused
the United States of seeking “unilateral and security advantages” that will
“pose the most grave consequences.”
Before leaving for a 2000 meeting with Jiang, Putin declared that, “China
really is our strategic partner.”
Current Chinese president Hu Jintao also took over where Jiang left off,
committing his country to “assiduously raising the Sino-Russian strategic
partnership of cooperation to new and higher levels.”
In
July 2001, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership reached a new height when
Russia and China signed the “Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and
Cooperation.” Both sides hailed the treaty, which took on added significance
since the events of 1999, as a “historic document that lays the foundation for
the development of Russian-Chinese ties.”
The treaty, which has a twenty-year duration, reiterates and expands upon
several important areas of Sino-Russian cooperation. In several respects, the
2001 treaty represents the most full-throated expression of Sino-Russian
cooperation and solidarity, suffused with an unmistakable anti-American timbre.
The
first area of cooperation contained in the treaty is familiar theme of joint
opposition to U.S. hegemony. It also reaffirms both sides’ support for the
other’s territorial integrity and promises to fully resolve any lingering
border issues. In addition, it repeats calls for cooperation in such areas as
“economy and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy
resources, transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and aviation and
information technology.
It
is important to note that the 2001 treaty does not create a formal alliance
between the two countries, as a 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty did. It contains no
provision for mutual defense if either partner is attacked by a third country.
Each side has emphasized its own independence and neither has expressed any serious
interest in creating a formal defense treaty. It does contain an ominous
provision, however, stating that, “in the case of the emergence of the threat
of aggression,” the two countries will “immediately make contact with each
other and carry out consultations in order to eliminate the emerging threat.”
To
illustrate the growing Sino-Russian partnership, the Russian and Chinese navies
began conducting naval exercises in 1999, including elements of Russia’s
Pacific Fleet and China’s Eastern Fleet. The 2001 version of these exercises
included Russian Tu-22 bombers equipped with long-range nuclear-capable cruise
missiles flying simulated missions against U.S. forces in eastern Asia, during
a wargame centered around a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.
Japan alleged that the bombers, along with two Su-27 fighter jets, violated its
airspace.
Military
coordination with Chinese forces brings into sharp relief Russia’s increasing
political partnership with China. The
chairman of the Diplomacy Faculty at Beijing University spoke to the
significance of joint military exercises: “Chinese-Russian joint military
maneuvers are a historical event, which means that Chinese-Russian military
cooperation has reached a record high level.”
Increased
political cooperation between Russia and China will be a reality for years to
come. The deputy director of the Institute for World Economy and International
Relations, which trains many Russian diplomats, opines that, “Relations with
China constitute the most important factor in Russian foreign policy strategy
today,” adding that, “in some ways, our relations with China are even more
important than with the United States.”
Throughout
the development of their strategic partnership, Russia and China have
emphasized areas of cooperation while doing their best to avoid potential
friction, such as the growing Chinese influence in the Russian Far East, which
many Russians fear will lead to the “Sinicization” of the region. Russian and
Chinese interests do not always coincide – without a common external threat
upon which to focus, the strategic partnership would diminish accordingly. The
Sino-Russian strategic partnership is therefore strengthened or weakened to the
degree that it focuses on areas of commonality. It is very important to realize
that mutual opposition to American power represents the central focus and
greatest strength of their relationship. This brings us to our next topic,
military cooperation between the two countries, which has the most potentially
ominous and far-reaching implications for the United States.
ARMS TRANSFERS
From the American perspective, the most disturbing aspect
of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is its military component, with
massive amounts of arms flowing from Russia to China over the past decade. It
is the Council’s position that Russian arms sales to China represent perhaps
the greatest long-term threat to peace in the Asia-Pacific region, due to the
China’s growing assertiveness and its threats to use force in order to pursue
its strategic ambitions. China’s military capability has grown by leaps and
bounds during the past decade, which is a direct consequence of Russian arms
exports. Russian arms sales have had a decisive impact on China’s ability to
project power beyond its littorals, into the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea,
where they threaten American interests, as well as some of her closest allies.
Make no mistake, the Chinese military buildup is largely
geared towards deterring, and if necessary, defeating, American armed forces
should they intervene in a military conflict between China and Taiwan. Numerous
government and military sources in fact label the United States as China’s most
likely future enemy. For example, China’s Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian
declared in 1999 that war between China and the United States is “inevitable,”
and that Chinese forces must “control the initiative in this war.”
In 2001, the vice chairman of China’s Central Military Command told attendees
at a conference that “during the period of China’s 10th five-year
plan [from 2001-2006], it is certain that war will break out in the Taiwan
Strait.” (emphasis
added)
Whether these dire prognostications take place in the
specified time frame, if at all, it is abundantly clear that the United States
sits atop the list of perceived enemies. Several publications posted on the
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml)
illustrate this quite nicely. China’s 2000 Defense White Paper warns that the
United States is “strengthening its military presence and bilateral alliances
in the region,” and raises concerns about “encroachments on China’s sovereignty
and interests in the South China Sea.”
Indeed, China conducted exercises in 1998 that included simulated nuclear
missile attacks against U.S. military forces in South Korea, Okinawa and
mainland Japan,
underscoring China’s determination to emerge victorious in a potential conflict
over Taiwan.
An explanation of Chinese militancy regarding Taiwan and
the importance it attaches to the island would be in order here. Beijing’s
desire for reunification is not necessarily borne of some nationalistic zeal or
fervent irredentism, despite conventionally accepted wisdom. Interestingly
enough, when China was in a much weaker position vis-à-vis the two superpowers
during the Cold War, it displayed considerably less hostility towards Taiwan
and deployed limited numbers of forces across the Taiwan Strait. With the
Soviet Union cleared from the chessboard, however, China’s strategic fortunes
improved dramatically, and it found itself poised to flex its muscle in the
region. Taiwan suddenly became a pressing concern.
Taiwan
is a highly successful economy that boasts some of the world’s largest
foreign-exchange reserves and would represent quite an economic prize to
Beijing. More importantly, China’s desire for reunification stems from Taiwan’s
position in one of the most strategically significant waterways in the world
and Beijing’s desire to control it. Only by considering China’s strategic
ambitions in the western Pacific can one understand China’s bellicosity towards
Taiwan.
Taiwan is positioned in the middle of the sea lanes that
bring oil and raw materials to America’s most important Asian allies, including
Japan, South Korea and Singapore. Taiwan guards the eastern entrances to the
South China Sea, which include the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Strait, which it
shares with the Philippines. By extending its strategic reach into the South
China and East China Seas, China would be able to control the area’s vital Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOC) that, in many respects, form the lifeblood of the
Asian economy. This is
very important to understand when attempting to ascertain China’s motives. As
part of this effort to dominate the region’s sea lanes, China also seeks to
control the vital strategic chokepoint of the Malacca Strait.
The Malacca Strait, just 1.5 miles wide at its narrowest
point, links the Pacific with the Indian Oceans, and represents the shortest
maritime route between three of the world’s most populous countries – India,
China and Indonesia. Through this passage transits the raw materials upon which
America and her Pacific allies so heavily depend. Almost of the oil imported by
Japan and South Korea passes through the Malacca Strait into the South China
Sea, for example.
Freighters
bound from Asia to the Middle East or Europe must also transit through Strait
of Malacca via the South China Sea, and over half of the world’s merchant fleet
(by tonnage) transits the strait each year. Controlling this artery of world
trade, the only viable international sea lane connecting the Pacific with the
Indian Ocean, would provide China with far-reaching strategic benefits that
could place America’s Asian allies, and their economic health, in a subservient
position to Chinese interests.
By
assuming control of important sea lanes, China would become the regional
suzerain, ensuring that important U.S. allies become ‘tributary states’ that
must defer to Chinese interests - or at least take them into very strong
consideration. One central objective of
U.S. Asian policy has been to prevent such a regional power from exercising
this sort of control over the area, and America’s Pacific allies have welcomed
the stability that the U.S. military presence has promoted. They do not wish to
see the region’s peace and stability threatened by the geopolitical
machinations of a strategically ambitious China. China often claims that it
“will never seek hegemony,” but its actions in the maritime reaches off its
coast, and elsewhere, belie such a claim.
The
Chinese navy has adopted a doctrine of “offshore active defense,” whereby it
seeks to develop the ability to gain “effective control of the seas within the
first island chain,” which means controlling the Taiwan Strait and the South
China Sea. To
implement its strategic vision, China also seeks to control the Paracel and
Spratly Island chains, as part of China’s “two island-chain strategy.”
China
seeks to occupy islands and outcroppings so far to the south that Chinese
military forces would practically be visible from Singapore and Indonesia. In
short, China has an ambitious strategic plan to assert control over the
region’s vital arteries of trade and supplant American influence. With that
brief look at China’s strategic objectives, let us examine the nature of
Russian arms transfers to China, for these have greatly facilitated China’s
ability to implement its ambitious policies.
Following the Soviet implosion, a weakened Russia had
little to sell except energy, military hardware and weapons technology. China,
an aspiring power that was seeking to rapidly modernize its military, was ready
to buy whatever Russia had on offer, especially following the termination of
Western arms sales in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. In
Russia, China found a willing partner. With the thawing of Sino-Russian
relations that had begun under Gorbachev in the late 1980s, the two countries
were ready to embark on a series of arms deals during the 1990s that
substantially strengthened China’s military capabilities while providing
valuable revenue to the Russian government. The Chinese market also kept
Russia’s arms industry functioning.
It
can be argued, in fact, that Chinese arms purchases have almost single-handedly
kept the Russian military industrial complex afloat. The Russian Defense
Minister recently commented that, “Russia’s defence industry complex can be
preserved only by supplying military equipment and arms to China.”
Andrei Dikarev, of Moscow’s Institute of Oriental Studies, adds that, “Without
Chinese investments in our military-industrial complex, we wouldn’t be able to
produce any modern arms for ourselves.” To a great extent then, Russian arms sales
to China are animated less by grand strategy than sheer economic necessity.
Some
Russian observers, wary of Chinese intentions, question the wisdom of
transferring so much military equipment and technology to what they perceive as
a future rival, but the
bedrock reality is that Russian defense firms need Chinese business in order to
survive. Many also fear that China will eventually crowd Russia out of the
international arms market by exporting its own versions of Russian equipment
like the Su-27, in violation of trade agreements. But their concerns are
largely ignored because of the powerful allure of the Chinese market. Russia
has tried to placate critics by placing certain limits on its arms transfers,
offering China, at least officially, less sophisticated electronics than it
provides its own forces with, for example.
Defense
relations have dwarfed other forms of economic cooperation between the two
countries. Since 1990, almost ninety percent of all Chinese arms imports have
come from Russia.
During the 1990s, China has officially purchased roughly $1 billion of Russian
weaponry and military technology per year.
The total value of arms sales for the years 1992-96 has been estimated at $4.5
billion. The actual
figure is probably much higher, however, if black market activity is
considered, involving the smuggling of equipment and technology.
China
may have purchased up to $3 billion in 1999 alone, and Russian media sources
have estimated that the Russian defense industry delivered more equipment to
the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) during 1998-99 than to the Russian military
itself.
Beginning in 2000, China is expected to purchase $20 billion in Russian weapons
and technology through 2004.
Officials from both countries announced in 2001 that military sales from Russia
to China would increase by 25% annually.
As
one observer notes, “the PLA is now the primary consumer of Russian large
combat vessels and conventional submarines and is very likely the major
consumer of very advanced Russian military technologies.”
By buying advanced weaponry from Russia, China plans to skip ahead generations
in military technology and eventually produce its own arms industry that can
produce state-of-the-art weaponry. Throughout the 1990s, the objective of the
Chinese military was to close the military technology gap with Western
countries from twenty to ten years.
The Chinese cause was further advanced in 1999, when Russia announced that it
was lifting all restrictions on military-technology transfers to China.
Traditionally,
China has had difficulties producing “da dongxi,” or “large things.” Its
arms industry has been unable to successfully manufacture large weapons
platforms such as warships or aircraft that matched world standards. With
Russian assistance, this is changing and China is steadily closing the
qualitative gap with the world’s advanced industrial powers. Through the
reverse engineering (guoganchua), of Russian designs, including
submarines, destroyers, cruisers, aircraft, air defense systems, tanks, nuclear
power systems and spacecraft, China is laying the stage for the indigenous
production of advanced systems that can compete on the world stage.
In
the 1990s, Russia and China established a joint military commission that
supervised military and military-industrial cooperation. It sought to integrate
the two countries’ military weaponry on the basis of Russian-made equipment and
training in order to prepare for “imperialist military aggression.”
Both countries have developed over thirty projects to adapt Russian defense
technology to Chinese standards.
As
many as 1,500 to 2,000 Russian technicians are working in Chinese research
facilities, developing such things as submarine technology, aircraft, cruise
missiles, laser weapons, miniaturized nuclear warheads and space-based
weaponry. The two
countries are working together to develop “sixth-generation warfare,” which is
characterized by information warfare, precision strikes, cyber attacks and the
use of exotic weaponry such as lasers of radio frequency (RF) weapons. Terms
such as “information dominance” and “asymmetrical warfare,” whereby the weak
can defeat the strong, suffuse Chinese military writings.
Chinese
president Hu Jintao recently told the Politburo that China must achieve a
“leap-forward style development in defense and army modernization,” adding that
economic progress needed to be “safeguarded by a strong national defense.” He
also warned that China will “ceaselessly strengthen its national defense and
military modernization.”
These comments further underscore China’s commitment to turning its armed
forces into a first-rate military, capable of meeting any challenge it may
face, including the American one.
The
array of hardware that China is purchasing at the Russian arms bazaar has
substantially improved China’s power projection capabilities. Chinese arms
sales have focused primarily on improving the capabilities of its air and naval
forces, which would play the most prominent role in a conflict in the Taiwan
Strait or South China Sea. Although many observers dismiss China’s military
capabilities because the majority of Chinese military equipment is obsolete,
‘pockets of excellence’ are being created with Russian assistance that will
allow China to pose a significant military threat in the near future.
A
2002 Pentagon report warns, for example, that by 2010 “a core of units will be
in place to allow the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) to execute the type of
regional combat operations envisioned by its current military doctrine.”
The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is steadily shifting in China’s
direction, thanks, once again, to Russian arms and technology transfers.
While
Russian arms transfers to China cover a wide range of equipment, from attack
helicopters to tanks, we will focus on those big-ticket transfers that enhance
China’s ability to project power into Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, where
American forces would be most threatened should they intervene in a possible
conflict between mainland China and Taiwan.
Naval Forces
China
purchased the first two ‘Type 956E’ (“E” standing for “Export”) Sovremenny-class destroyers in 1997
for $1 billion, which were delivered in 1999 and 2000.
Both destroyers are assigned to the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) East
Sea Fleet that faces Taiwan and Japan. These ships were original “stock”
versions, designed without any great concerns for stealth or combat
survivability. These ships had modest anti-aircraft and limited anti-submarine
capabilities. They were originally designed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s as
offensive weapon platforms to attack American aircraft carriers and Aegis-equipped
warships, which is why they are so attractive to China.
The
first Chinese purchases of these destroyers came on the heels of a 1996
incident in the Taiwan Strait, when the U.S. deployed the Independence
and Nimitz battle groups to waters near Taiwan. This was in response to
China’s attempted intimidation of Taiwan, in which Chinese test firing of
missiles bracketed the island in an attempt to influence presidential
elections. Unable to mount a sufficient response to the challenge, China was
motivated to acquire weapon systems capable of meeting the American carrier
threat. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China’s purchase of the
Russian Sovremmenys advanced this cause, stating in its 2002 report on
Chinese military power that the destroyers “provide China with immediate
improvement to its warfighting capabilities.”
China
purchased another two new Sovremmenys from Russia in 2002 for
$1.5 billion. These are improved versions of the original design, which will
augment China’s increasing blue water capabilities and further alter the
military balance in the Taiwan Strait after they enter service in 2005. The
‘Type 956EM’ (“M” standing for “Modernized”) version reportedly incorporates
stealth shaping in order to evade detection, and carries updated weapons that
allow it to engage surface and airborne targets at greater distances.
It
may even carry the S400 anti-aircraft missile, for example, which has a
reported range of 250 miles and is guided by an improved phased array radar
that is more difficult to jam.
Such a system would represent a significant upgrade to Chinese naval air
defenses, which have been rather inadequate in the past, by most standards.
Chinese purchases of Russian naval air defense systems, such as the naval
version of the S-300, with its 125-mile range, and the SA-N-7, have
substantially improved the PLAN’s ability to defend against air attacks. The
‘Type 956EM’ is also reportedly able to withstand more battle damage than its
predecessor. The Sovremmenys would be most effective when operating
under the umbrella of land-based or naval aviation assets and in groups of
other warships to defend against a range of attacks.
The
destroyers are of such great concern, however, because of the weapons packages
they employ, the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-26 Yakhont anti-ship
missiles, in particular. These were specifically designed to defeat the Aegis
area air defense system employed by the U.S. Navy, and are considered the most
lethal anti-ship missiles in the world today, against which the Navy has scant
ability to defend, at present.
The
Sunburn combines a blistering Mach 2.5 speed with a very low-level
flight pattern that uses radical end maneuvers to throw off defenses, making it
especially difficult to track and intercept. It may be capable of dive speeds
approaching 3,000 miles per hour.
After detecting the missile, Phalanx point-defense systems would have
only a few seconds to intercept the missile before it impacts with devastating
effects.
At
least some of the Sunburns China received may have been nuclear-armed.
These would be capable of carrying nuclear-tipped warheads with explosive
yields as great as 200 kilotons.
One successful strike by a nuclear-tipped Sunburn against a carrier
battle group could cost the lives of thousands of U.S. military personnel, even
in the absence of a direct hit. Each Sovremmeny-class destroyer can
carry eight SS-N-22 missiles. According to retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon,
the Sunburn is certainly enough to “make the 7th Fleet think
twice” before venturing into hostile waters.
The
Yakhont anti-ship missile may be even more capable than the Sunburn,
with a range of roughly 300 kilometers, almost double the Sunburn’s
160-kilometer range, which would greatly extend the combat range of the
destroyers. It is also credited with having a land attack capability that can
place shore installations and inland targets at risk.
Each new Sovremmeny may carry up to sixteen of the smaller missiles,
with some reports suggesting that each destroyer may carry up to twenty-four Yakhonts.
This added firepower would substantially upgrade the combat potential of the
new Sovremmenys. It has also been reported that China plans to purchase
two Slava-class cruisers armed with sixteen P-500 anti-ship missiles,
which would, with a 330-mile range, provide the PLAN with further punch.
China’s purchases of Russian submarines are also a cause for concern.
China’s
purchases of Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines have also increased
the PLAN’s combat power. China purchased four Kilos from Russia during
the 1990s, two of which were the ‘877’ export models while the other two were
the more capable ‘Project 636’ versions that Russia produced for its own navy.
In 2002, China purchased eight more of the upgraded ‘Project 636’ Kilos,
which will substantially enhance its ability to blockade Taiwan and challenge
U.S. naval supremacy in contested waters. The new submarines will be delivered
over a five-year period, bringing the total force to twelve by 2005.
Because
of their quiet diesel-electric propulsion systems, these submarines are ideally
suited for operations in the shallow waters of the East and South China Seas. The
2002 Defense Department report on the Chinese military declares that the Kilos
“provide Beijing with access to previously unavailable quieting and weapons
technology.” The U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence rated the ‘Project 636’ submarines as comparably
quiet to the U.S. Los Angeles-class SSNs. At tactical speeds of three to
ten knots, they may be as quiet as the improved Los Angeles-class 688i
submarines and quieter than older Los Angeles-class boats.
Western
diesel-electric submarines posing as adversaries in naval exercises have
reportedly been able to penetrate the ASW screens of American carrier battle
groups and stage mock attacks before being detected. Similarly, allied
diesel-electric boats have reportedly been able to successfully “stalk and kill”
U.S. nuclear attack submarines during exercises.
Chinese Kilos with well-trained crews and sophisticated weapons could
potentially pose a legitimate threat to both American surface ships and
submarines in a conflict. Mine-laying Kilos could also be particularly
useful weapons, considering the damage they could inflict on commercial
shipping in the Taiwan Strait and the limited minesweeping resources currently
available to the U.S Navy.
Reportedly,
China has experienced some difficulty in maintaining its original Kilos,
with two possibly being returned to Russia for repairs after developing battery
problems. These kinks
should be worked out, however, as the PLAN’s familiarity with the boats
increase and crews grow proficient in operating them.
China
will likely incorporate the Kilo’s design features into its own domestic
submarine production to improve quieting, propulsion, weapons development and
ship design. Future nuclear submarine programs will certainly reflect Russian
influence, as the ‘Type 093’-class SSN currently under development, certainly
does. Scheduled to enter service by 2005 and quite possibly sooner, the ‘Type
093’ incorporates much of the technology found in the Russian Victor III SSN.
Chinese submarines will also carry advanced Russian weaponry on board.
These
submarines can be equipped with two next-generation weapon systems developed by
Russia. The three-stage Klub anti-ship cruise missile has a range of
roughly 186 miles, which is close to the defense radius of an aircraft carrier
battle group, and packs a 450 lb. warhead.
During the final stage of its flight, the missile accelerates to supersonic
speeds before diving on its target, which greatly complicates defenses.
The updated Kilos can carry the Klub, in addition to the 53-65KE
wake-homing torpedo, which is a potent anti-ship weapon.
The
other advanced Russian system, known as the Shkval (Squall), is a
solid-rocket propelled anti-submarine torpedo. It is a fearsome weapon that
achieves an incredible underwater speed of 230-300 miles per hour. A targeted
submarine has very little chance to evade this weapon and there are currently
no defenses for it. It has no counterpart in Western navies. In 1998, China
acquired at least forty of these torpedoes from Russia.
Among the dead from the Kursk incident was a Chinese naval officer who
was on board the ill-fated Russian submarine to monitor test firings of the Shkval.
The ‘Type-093’ will be able to carry the missile, although reports suggest
that the torpedo tubes of the initial Kilos were not large enough to
carry the Shkval.
There
have also been reports of Chinese plans to purchase Akula II-class
nuclear attack submarines from Russia.
These are highly formidable, quiet submarines that can reach depths of 2,000
feet and carry a formidable array of weapons. These advanced submarines would
pose a significant threat to U.S. naval forces in the region, but there has
been no official announcement regarding a possible deal as yet. The Akula
IIs would be capable of carrying the Shkval.
Air Forces
In
2000-2001, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) introduced the
concept of an “offensive and defensive character” for its forces, as opposed to
the purely “defensive” posture that has traditionally guided Chinese doctrine.
Aircraft purchases from Russia have enabled the PLAAF to evolve such a concept,
as they have modernized China’s air force and significantly upgraded China’s
power projection capabilities.
While
most of its 3,400 aircraft are aging and obsolete aircraft, the PLAAF is
creating a ‘pocket of excellence,’ by modernizing its air forces in the
strategically important military districts across the Taiwan Strait. To
accomplish this, it has purchased or produced under license scores of advanced
“fourth-generation” Su-27 and Su-30 fighter/attack planes from Russia. As of
June 2003, China may have received up to 200 Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft from
Russia.
It has also obtained licensing agreements to build scores of these aircraft in
its own factories.
In
1991, China purchased its initial batch of 26 Su-27 Flanker aircraft for
about $1 billion, which were delivered in 1992. In May 1995, it purchased
another two dozen Su-27s, which were delivered in April 1996.
The Su-27 is truly a world-class fighter jet that is at least the equal of
frontline U.S. F-15, and in many respects, superior. It was originally designed
by the Soviet Union to defeat top-of-the-line U.S. aircraft like the F-15 and
F-16.
On
at least two occasions in the 1990s, Russian Su-27s outperformed the mighty F-15
in several performance criteria during ‘blue on blue’ engagements, at both long
and short ranges.
Its performance edge grew appreciably at short range. The Su-27 is extremely
agile and can perform maneuvers that “no Western fighter can emulate.”
Its excellent range also provides a tremendous boost to the PLAAF, giving it
the range to project power deep into the maritime regions off China’s coast.
China
also bargained skillfully with the Russians, offering to buy more planes if
they would transfer modern aircraft technology to China, including components
and parts, so that the planes could be assembled in China. The Russians
complied and in 1996, China purchased from Sukhoi the license to produce two
hundred Su-27s in the city of Shenyang. The first two Su-27s assembled in
China, with the help of over 100 Russian engineers, were delivered to the PLAAF
in 1998. This
factory can turn out ten to fifteen aircraft per year, with a final inventory
goal of 275. The PLAAF
expects to field over 300 Su-27s in total.
China
purchased 40 Su-30MKK (Modernized Commercially for China) aircraft from Russia
in 1999, which were delivered in 2000 and 2001.
Reports indicate that China may have ordered another 40 Su-30s in 2001, for
both the PLAAF and the PLAN, which would be delivered over the course of the
next three years.
The sale is reported to include air-to-air missiles, laser-guided bombs and
large numbers of air-launched cruise missiles.
China also purchased license agreements to produce 250 Su-30s
domestically.
The
Su-30MKK is a technologically advanced, well-armed, improved version of the
Su-27. It retains the air superiority features of the Flanker while
incorporating increased multi-role capabilities. It excels in the ground attack
role and can carry the Russian Kh-31 supersonic cruise missile, which is
co-manufactured in China, designed specifically to attack Aegis ships
and Patriot missile batteries.
It can also carry an air-launched version of the Sunburn.
The radar on the Su-30 MKK can also “data-link” with the Su-27s’ radar,
providing the aircraft with a cooperative target engagement capability.
This, and other capabilities, is eroding the traditional U.S. lead in avionics
and radar technology.
China
is also closing the gap in air-to-air missilery, as well, courtesy of its
northern arms merchant. The Russian R-77 air-to-air missile, NATO codename Adder,
is an excellent system that is comparable to the U.S. AMRAAM. China is using
the R-77 to develop its own such missile, the ‘Project 129,’ which could be
fielded by the latter part of this decade.
Russian AA-10 and AA-11 air-to-air missiles, which are highly capable, have
also upgraded China’s aerial combat capabilities.
The
AA-11 is the world’s first effective “helmet-sighted” air-to-air missile, meaning
that a pilot can aim the missile without lining up the nose of his aircraft
with his target. It can be fired from an off-center angle of 60 degrees, while
the U.S. AIM-9M Sidewinder can acquire targets only 27 degrees off
center.
At knife range, a Su-27 or Su-30 armed with such a missile would enjoy a
decided tactical advantage over an adversary.
China
has also sought AWACS planes that would allow the PLAAF to coordinate the
actions of scores of aircraft, increase the accuracy of its missiles and provide
greater battlespace awareness to its forces. Having an AWACS capability would
serve as a force multiplier, significantly increasing China’s combat potential
and ability to threaten American forces in theater. China originally sought the
highly capable Phalcon system from Israel, which was to be built upon
modified Russian IL-76 cargo planes. The deal fell through, however, as Israel
cancelled the sale under intense pressure by the United States.
Not
surprisingly, China turned to Russia for help and in 2000, Russia agreed to
supply China with four to six A-50E Beriev advanced radar aircraft,
follow-ons to the A-50 Mainstay. The aircraft, valued at $200 million
each, should be delivered to China beginning in 2005.
Although it lacks the range, sophistication and overall capability of the Phalcon,
the A-50E can coordinate up to thirty aircraft at one time and track targets
over a five hundred mile radius. The system can also be integrated into China’s
land and sea-based missile launch systems, increasing the accuracy of Chinese
missile strikes.
Air Defenses
Russia
has also assisted China in upgrading its air defense systems, which has enabled
China to make great strides in this area. After the 1991 Gulf War, China
realized that its air defenses were woefully inadequate in the face of
precision weapons, cruise missiles and stealth aircraft, which prompted efforts
to procure a modern system capable of meeting these threats. Following the 1999
U.S.-led campaign in Kosovo, the Chinese military adopted an air defense system
based on the concept of “Three Attacks and Three Defenses.” The three attacks
are directed against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters, while
the three defenses are oriented towards defending against precision strikes,
electronic warfare and reconnaissance elements, including satellites.
To
implement this policy, China has purchased from Russia state-of-the-art systems
like the S-300/SA-10 Grumble area defense system, which is similar to
the American Patriot. Many consider it superior, in fact, which would
come as no shock since Patriot was “dumbed down” from its inception to
comply with ABM Treaty restrictions. Much of this technology may be
incorporated into China’s domestically produced anti-aircraft systems, such as
the HQ-9.
The
SA-10b (S-300PMU) has a range of 56 miles, while the SA-10c (S-300 PMU1) has a
greater range of 125 miles.
Russia has supplied China with eight divisions of the S-300PMU1 system. In
2001, Russia agreed to supply another four divisions of the more modern
S-300PMU2. Their high
intercept altitude (30 kilometers) and long range provide China with extensive
air defense coverage. The S-300’s surveillance radar can detect aircraft from
about 190 miles, providing substantial warning time to mount an integrated
defense.
In
addition, the S-300 class of missile can attack cruise missiles and some
classes of ballistic missiles.
Russia has claimed that it is effective against stealth aircraft, as well.
Russian engineers have claimed that upgraded versions of the S-300 can attack
stealth aircraft at ranges of sixty miles.
The PLAAF first deployed the missile batteries near Beijing. By 1999, several
batteries were deployed near Longtian and Xiamen, in Fujian Province, across
the strait from Taiwan to defend key installations from attacks in the event of
conflict.
In
addition to the longer range S-300, China has also purchased from Russia over
two dozen Tor SA-15 air defense units, which are designed to engage
targets at short range.
It has a range of seven miles against aircraft and three miles against cruise
missiles. It can also
engage unmanned aerial vehicles and some reports suggest that it has some
capabilities against short-range ballistic missiles.
The Chinese air defense network now covers most of the developed, coastal
regions of the country and the more important inland areas, such as Beijing.
China
has also designed, with Russian assistance, the FT-2000 anti-radar missile,
referred to as the “AWACS killer,” to destroy enemy electronic warfare aircraft
at ranges in excess of 100 kilometers.
The Chinese and Russian militaries realize that the U.S. military is highly
dependent on these platforms and have focused on ways to defeat them. The
FT-2000 would represent a serious threat to American capabilities since AWACS
and E-2C Hawkeyes figure so prominently in U.S. tactical operations. The
Russian influence is unmistakable, as the system bears a very close resemblance
to the S-300.
Space and Missile Forces
The
Chinese military has identified space as a strategic center of gravity and
plans to exploit the heavens in the event of conflict. Not surprisingly, China
has turned to Russia to provide the technical acumen to help develop its space
program, pursuant to Sino-Russian joint statements dating to the mid-1990s.
Russia has in fact provided a wealth of technical assistance to China’s space
program, which has obvious military applications. The 1999 Cox Committee report
on Chinese espionage named Russia as a major supplier of space technology to
China, and quoted a senior PLAN officer who averred that, “the deployment of
space-based weapons will be bound to make ‘mastery of space’ a prerequisite of
naval victory.”
The
report also stated that “based on the significant level of PRC-Russian
cooperation on weapons development, it is possible that the PRC will be able to
use nuclear reactors to pump lasers with pulse energies high enough to destroy
satellites. In addition, Russian cooperation could help the PRC develop an
advanced radar system using lasers to track and image satellites.”
The
American dependency on space systems is well understood by China and it will
try to attack this critical vulnerability in the event of conflict. This is an
integral part of the doctrine of “asymmetrical warfare” that so fascinates
Chinese military planners. The Pentagon’s 1998 report about China’s military
modernization states that, “The ability to damage or destroy satellites will
provide China with a strategic weapon against the U.S. military, which relies
heavily on the use of space-based equipment.”
In January 2001, Chinese intelligence officials in fact threatened to shoot
down an American satellite, claiming that U.S. reconnaissance satellites
constituted a threat to Chinese sovereignty.
China
is developing ASAT weapons that may include ground-based lasers or micro
satellites that can be launched from new mobile space launch vehicles.
These new micro satellites can de developed into anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
rather easily. China has completed ground tests of an advanced micro satellite
ASAT weapon, known as ‘parasitic satellite,’ which will soon be tested in
space. Russian
assistance has contributed immeasurably to these programs.
Russian
assistance is also providing China with the space assets that can monitor and
target U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific during conflict. In a 2001
military exercise taking place on and around Dongshan Island, less than 100
miles from Taiwan, China may have used for the first time reconnaissance and
navigation satellites in support of military operations.
In the next few years, China may have an initial photo and radar satellite
constellation in place sufficient to support a military campaign against
Taiwan. China is developing a new series of high-resolution electro-optical
satellites and radar satellites that can penetrate clouds.
In
July 2001, China and Russia signed a five-year space cooperation agreement, in
which they agreed to the joint development of a regional missile defense
system, as well as cooperation on the development of new generations of
high-tech weaponry, with funding up to $500 million.
The general director of the Russian Aerospace Agency stated that, with regard
to China, “Russia will be prepared to share individual technologies and their
components and to conduct joint research without any restrictions on themes on
the basis of mutual interest.”
Russia has assisted China in developing a manned space program and the two
countries are pursuing a joint project to manufacture a 10-kilowatt onboard
nuclear power source for China’s spacecraft.
In addition to the use of space platforms and weaponry, the Chinese military
also relies on the use of short-range ballistic missiles to secure military
victory.
The
use of short-range ballistic missiles figures prominently in Chinese military
doctrine. Chinese doctrine calls for strategic surprise, emphasizing the early
and mass use of ballistic missiles to paralyze the enemy. It hopes to secure a
rapid victory before American forces can even come to Taiwan’s defense. A
Chinese military document, referred to as ‘Document 65,’ calls for a rapid
campaign that precludes decisive American intervention – “We will gain control
of Taiwan before full deployment of U.S. troops. In this case, the only thing
the U.S. can do is fight a war with the purpose of retaliation.”
According
to the Pentagon’s latest report about Chinese military power, “Beijing has
greatly expanded its arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic
missiles (and long-range strike aircraft) that are ready for immediate
application should the PLA be called upon to conduct war before its
modernization aspirations are fully realized.”
One observer notes that, “The PLA’s theater missiles and a supporting
space-based surveillance network are emerging not only as a tool of
psychological warfare, but a potentially devastating weapon of military
utility.”
Analysts
have found that China is increasing its ballistic missile force aimed at Taiwan
by fifty per year and could have as many as 600 missiles in position by 2007.
As of last year, it had 350 short-range ballistic missiles, mostly CSS-6 and
CSS-7s, in place across the Taiwan Strait in the Nanjing region.
The accuracy and lethality of these missiles have been improved by
incorporating satellite-assisted guidance systems, such as Russia’s GLONASS.
The
new CSS-6 missiles will employ satellite-assisted navigation that will increase
their accuracy against Taiwan and U.S. forces in Okinawa, according to the
Pentagon’s latest assessment.
China also plans on the use of saturation strikes by short-range ballistic
missiles to attack American carrier battle groups should a conflict arise. The
accuracy of these strikes would be enhanced significantly by the incorporation
of space-based systems.
China
certainly does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict
involving the U.S. Chinese General Wu Jiangao summarized this by saying that,
“When countries possessing nuclear weapons and high-tech conventional weapons
are involved in a war in which the conflict is intensifying, the possible use
of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.”
This was made further evident when the head of Chinese military intelligence
warned in 1996 that the United States would not be willing to trade Los Angeles
for Taipei. China’s development of its DF-41 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM will enhance
its ability to make good on that threat. Let us hope that choice need never be
made.
From
enforcing territorial claims in the South China Sea to the use of intimidation
or armed force against Taiwan, the Chinese military will play an integral part
in implementing Beijing’s bold strategic vision. By helping to create ‘pockets
of excellence,’ Russian arms and technology transfers have contributed greatly
to China’s defense modernization, which will allow China to exercise its
growing military power in the years to come. This modernization, which could
not have taken place without extensive Russian assistance, has had a
deleterious influence on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and may substantially
raise the cost of American intervention in the event of conflict. In addition to military cooperation, the
Sino-Russian sinews of partnership have been strengthened by the growth of
economic relations, which have greatly facilitated the development of joint
relations.
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
Historically,
political relations between Russia and China have far outpaced the economic
aspect of their relationship, but this may no longer be the case. Economic
factors have played a leading role in the burgeoning Sino-Russian entente, and
in some respects, form the material basis of their strategic partnership. The
1990s witnessed many bilateral meetings that resulted in a series of agreements
to increase economic cooperation between the two countries. This was
encapsulated quite nicely at the 1996 summit, where both countries issued a
joint statement holding that fields such as “energy, machine building,
aviation, space, agriculture, communications and high technologies should be
made priorities in bilateral cooperation of major projects.”
Russia and China have affirmed cooperation in these fields repeatedly since
1996.
The
“commercialization” of Russian-Chinese relations now assumed an important, even
strategic, significance. As Sino-Russian political and economic interests are
increasingly commingled, the prospects for an enduring, vital relationship grow
accordingly. After the 1996 summit, a Russian government official affirmed
that, “Russia and China are able to create a powerful economic alliance in Asia
which will determine the climate on the market of the Asia-Pacific region in
the future.” One
Chinese academic predicts that, “China and Russia will upgrade their current
level of trade to match their political and military relations, strategic
partnerships and their positions as great powers.”
Although
increasing the level of trade has been a major priority for the two countries
since the mid-90s, it has yet to meet original expectations. The 2000 Russian
Foreign Policy Concept conceded that Russia and China must “bring the scale of
economic interaction in conformity with the level of political relations.”
Current trade levels stand at roughly $12 billion, disappointingly shy of
original expectations. The 1996 summit called for a $20 billion trade level by
the year 2000, a figure that has yet to materialize by 2003, but both sides are
confident that trade levels will rise to $20 billion in the near future.
To that end, Russia and China signed a joint
declaration this May stating that both countries expect a major breakthrough in
the development of trade and economic relations. According to the declaration,
both sides agreed to “active cooperation between both states in the
trade-economic, military-technical, scientific, energy and transport spheres and
also in atomic energy, in the financial, space and aviation industries and in
information technology.”
This
would include technology sharing and the establishment of joint companies, in
addition to increased cooperation in a host of other areas, such as banking.
Both sides expressed the need for cooperation in high technology engineering
and electronics development, in addition to other goods with high added value.
The most successful sectors of the Russian economy, such as those dealing in
military hardware, space technology and nuclear power, have limited domestic
demand. Therefore, foreign markets, particularly the Chinese one, are
especially attractive to these industries. One Russian expert avers that,
“Chinese business is crucial for Russia’s short-term survival as an industrial
power.”
The
Chinese economy has grown by leaps and bounds over the last decade, fueled by
increasing consumer spending, a strong export base, and a tremendous growth in
foreign direct investment. Since 1991, China has been the recipient of over
$350 billion in foreign direct investment, which stands in stark contrast to
the paltry $19 billion that Russia received during the same period.
All of this has placed great demands on the country’s resources.
If
China hopes to maintain its economic growth, it must find ways to meet its
ever-increasing demand for natural resources and raw materials. By roughly
2020, China may be unable to meet its demand for resources such as oil, iron,
steel, sulfur, aluminum and other important minerals. It also faces critical
shortages in electricity and water. In 2002 alone, energy consumption in China
grew by 20%. Chinese
energy consumption is expected to double between 2000 and 2020.
Energy
China
has a vampire’s thirst for oil. Its use of oil will rise from an estimated 3.8
million barrels per day at present to 9.5 million barrels in 2020, a 150%
increase. By that same year, the gap between domestic oil production and
domestic consumption will rise to nearly 6 million barrels per day, up from 1.2
million in 1999.
Fully aware of future shortfalls, China has embarked on an aggressive,
potentially threatening campaign to ensure its projected energy needs.
In
1992, for example, China formally announced its claim to the Paracel and Spratly
Island chains, which are also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines,
respectively, in addition to all subsea resources lying in adjacent areas of
the South China Sea.
China claims that the South China Sea contains reserves of 130 billion barrels
– more than the combined reserves of Europe and Latin America.
Some Chinese estimates place it at 213 billion barrels.
Of course, China’s interest in this area will only grow as its energy demands
increase. It has also turned to it northern neighbor in order to help meet its
future energy requirements.
Russia,
awash in vast amounts of natural resources, and in dire need of revenue, is in
a prime position to help China meet its demands. Herein lie the economic
imperatives that help drive the Sino-Russian partnership. China can obtain from
Russia the energy it needs to feed its voracious appetite, while a
cash-strapped Russia finds in China a vast export market and a potential
investor in its relatively untapped Far East energy resources. This aspect of
the evolving strategic partnership cannot be overstated, as it is critical to
Sino-Russian bilateral economic cooperation.
Speaking
to the import of Sino-Russian cooperation in the field of energy, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry press secretary proffered that, “We believe development of
energy cooperation can make our strategic partnership even stronger.”
This cooperation in the energy field was reaffirmed in May of this year, when
both countries issued a joint statement declaring that, “The sides consider
cooperation in the energy sphere to be of enormous importance to both states.”
The
vast Chinese demand for oil can guarantee Russia a stable, long-term export
market. An economically vulnerable Russia is particularly sensitive to
fluctuations in world crude prices. A $1 change in the price of a barrel of
crude oil is worth roughly $1.2 billion to the Russian economy,
and any drop in price can negatively affect the already beleaguered Russian
economy. Even if Chinese demands for oil dropped in leaner economic times,
Russian oil exports would still be considerable, which would soften the
economic blow to the Russian government.
The
Russian budget of 1998, for example, was reportedly predicated upon a worldwide
price of $15.50 per barrel. When global oil prices failed to meet that mark,
Russia lost sorely needed income, which took its toll on the Russian treasury.
Russian resistance to America’s military action against Iraq may have been
motivated in no small part by the prospect of greater oil supplies that would
become available after Saddam’s regime was deposed and oil restrictions were
removed. The increased supply would lower crude prices and hence, the price of
Russian oil. To expand cooperation in this field, Russia and China are working
closely on several projects that will benefit both countries.
This
past May, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) inked a preliminary
agreement with the Russian oil company, Yukos, to ship Siberian oil to China
via a $2.5 billion, 1,400-mile pipeline that would link Angarsk in eastern
Siberia with Daqing, China. Beginning in 2005, the estimated time of pipeline’s
completion, Yukos would ship roughly 20 million barrels per year from 2006-2009
and 30 million tons annually from 2010, under a deal worth about $150 billion.
The Russian Treasury would pocket about $65 billion from the deal, which has
definite strategic implications for both countries. According to Sergei
Lusyanin of Moscow’s Institute of Far Eastern Studies, this project is “more than just a commercial deal, it is a
strategic choice.”
China’s
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which is exploring oil and gas resources
in the Russian Far East, has also sought equity in Russian energy companies
exploring in the region. China may also participate in the development of oil
and gas pipelines from deposits off Russia’s Sakhalin Island, which is a
critical node of energy development in Russia’s Far East.
Crude
oil deliveries to China by rail, through Zabaikalsk to the Manzhouli border
station, and by sea, from Russian ports, surpassed 3 million tons in 2002 and
may exceed 5 million tons by 2005.
Yukos and CNPC have signed a three-year, $1.1 billion contract that would
supply 6 million tons of oil to China by rail, beginning this June. The Russian
government is expected to collect between $300 and $400 million from this deal.
In addition, Russia has modernized and expanded an oil refining plant in the
Khabarovsk region, which will further increase oil shipments to China. Russia can also pump oil from fields in Kazakhstan
to Irkutsk, where it can then be sent to China.
Experts
also believe that Russia will be able to export 25 to 30 million tons of oil
annually from the Kovytka field in Siberia to help satisfy China’s insatiable
demand for the valuable resource. The two countries signed an agreement in 2001
to jointly develop oil and gas resources in eastern Siberia, the first ever
such venture between the two countries.
It is estimated that Siberia has up to 11.5 billion tons of oil reserves,
which doesn’t include the largely unexplored reserves of the Russian Far East.
Russia
possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas on the planet, estimated at
roughly 30% of the world’s supply.
Beijing has more than a passing interest in that fact, since Chinese consumption
of natural gas is projected to increase by a staggering 1,129% by 2020.
Natural gas is especially attractive to China due to its limited environmental
impact on China’s polluted cities compared with coal, with which China is well
endowed. Russia and China have agreements in various stages of development on a
slew of pipeline projects that would bring natural gas from Siberia to China.
One
proposal would deliver gas from western Siberia to Xinjiang, then to Shanghai
and other eastern cities via an East-West pipeline. Another would connect the
Itkutsk region of eastern Siberia with northeast China.
Depending on the course of pipeline construction, which is subject to a number
of variables, Russia could be able to export between 25 and 30 billion cubic meters
of natural gas to China each year.
To
help meet China’s electricity shortage, recently developed hydroelectric
stations in Siberia can potentially supply China with 15 to 18 billion
kilowatts of electricity annually. In addition, Russia may help construct six
nuclear reactors in China, which would generate up to 1.5 trillion kilowatts.
Russia expects to receive orders from China for three additional reactors,
including one fast-breeder reactor, over the next two years alone.
Joint
construction of the Tianwan nuclear facility in Lianyungang, on China’s eastern
coast, should be completed by the end of 2004, with two reactors becoming
operational in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Speaking to the need for nuclear energy in China and no doubt for Russian
involvement in this endeavor, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander
Rumyantsev declared that, “only nuclear energy can satisfy the needs of this
Asian giant.”
China
is also securing other raw materials from eastern Russia, such as steel,
aluminum, copper, timber and chemical products – all for very cheap prices. The
eastern segments of the vast Russian expanse are thus becoming a vital
strategic rear area for China as it attempts to secure its economic future. In
1989, China adopted a plan to expand its influence in the Russian Far East,
which was accelerated in the second half of the 1990s, guided in large part by
its economic ambitions.
This expansion of Chinese influence in the Russian Far East continues apace.
In
the final analysis, China will depend on Russian economic cooperation, most
notably in the field of energy, in order to realize its economic ambitions.
Russia, hungry for hard currency, has an equal stake in providing Beijing with
the energy and resources it requires. In addition, China is one of the few
countries to which Russia exports processed goods in addition to raw materials.
This cooperation provides economic teeth to the political developments that
have occurred in recent years, which will help solidify the partnership as the
two countries’ futures become increasingly entwined.
CONCLUSION
The
Sino-Russian strategic partnership is a clear example of balance-of-power
realism, and will be a fact of international politics as long as both nations
determine that it serves their individual interests. It is not a formal
military alliance, nor is it likely to become one in the near future, barring
unforeseeable events. In several respects, it acts as a warning to the United
States. Its practical effect, however, will be to hedge American influence and
complicate American diplomacy in several different areas. As long as it focuses
on external threats (the United States) and successfully manages sources of
tension, it will remain a viable force in world affairs with which the U.S.
must reckon as it charts its policies, especially in Eurasia.
The
most troublesome aspect of this partnership is of course the massive level of
Russian arms and technology transfers to China. These are vastly improving
China’s power projection capabilities and threatening to decisively shift the
balance of power in the Western Pacific. If U.S. forces are ever drawn into a
conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, their task will be complicated by the
massive infusion of Russian arms and technology that have dramatically enhanced
China’s warfighting potential. The confidence that these transfers instill in
China’s leadership may be destabilizing in itself if it believes they tilt the
military balance in Beijing’s direction. There is very little the U.S. can do
to affect this dimension of the Sino-Russian partnership – it is too important
to both sides, albeit for different reasons.
The
Sino-Russian strategic partnership, however, does not represent a monolithic
force that lacks internal strain or contradiction, and legitimate concerns
about its strength must be tempered by the recognition of potential friction
between the two countries. Structural tensions inherent in a complex
relationship such as this can place practical limits on the reach of this
partnership and limit its scope.
Russia
has concerns about China’s growing influence in its Far East, for example, and
many Russians believe that an increasingly powerful China will simply annex the
region at some point. Many Russians also question the practice of selling advanced
military equipment to a country they fear will become a future enemy.
As
for China, it still recalls Russia’s imperial past and its encroachments on
Chinese territory. In fact, Russia is referred to as “the hungry land” in
Chinese, and not without reason. To that extent, mutual distrust does still
exist and will only fade away with the passage of time.
In
addition, both China and Russia still need the United States, and that is where
the U.S. can exert its greatest leverage. By taking advantage of its dominant
position, Washington can use its economic carrot to create fissures in the
Sino-Russian relationship as both countries compete for American favor. Both
countries, especially China, need access to American markets, technology and
capital in order to survive in the global economy. Quite simply, China cannot
realize its economic ambitions without the United States. The U.S. offers the
promise of trade and investment far in excess of what Russia, or any
other country can provide, so it must avoid unduly antagonizing Washington,
despite Beijing’s histrionics about American “hegemony” and “unilateralism.”
In
addition, China is concerned about the effect a powerful Sino-Russian
partnership would have on the U.S. relationship with Japan, which represents a
thorn in China’s side. One of China’s principle strategic objectives is to
weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and pursuing aggressive policies that may
strengthen Tokyo’s ties with Washington would be counterproductive to say the
least. China must therefore balance strategic interests that exist in tension,
and juggle them accordingly.
In
the final analysis, the United States must keep a wary yet unjaundiced eye on
the evolving Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Although it must accept the
disturbing fact of Russian arms and technology transfers to China, other
aspects of their relationship need not be so threatening. The U.S. should
welcome increased trade and economic cooperation that can lead to the further
integration of both countries into the global economy. To the extent that their
strategic partnership serves that end and contributes to the economic success
of both countries, it poses less of a threat. Washington should harbor no
illusion, however, about the realities of power politics and the extent to
which China will go to realize its grand strategic objectives.
This
will mean that the United States must stay actively engaged in Eurasian affairs
and persuade China that it has far more to gain by constructive engagement than
the use of force. It is especially important that the United States maintain
its strategically pivotal alliance with Japan, for America’s political and
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region hinges on a solid U.S.- Japanese
relationship.
The
U.S. must maintain a robust military presence in the region to deter Chinese
adventurism and demonstrate a resolve to resist aggression, for American
credibility in East Asia depends on it. So does the peace of the Asian Pacific
region. Very importantly, Washington must not become overly distracted by its
necessary campaign against the forces of terror and lose sight of the distant
storm clouds that may be gathering in the Western Pacific. By staying so
engaged, the U.S. will obey the old Arab maxim to hold ones friends close – while
holding ones enemies closer.
